We show an architecture that enables runtime verification. Runtime verification focusses on the design of formal languages for the specification of properties that must hold during runtime. In this paper, we take matters one step further and describe a uniform modelling and development paradigm for software systems that can monitor the quality of software systems as they execute, set-up, tear-down and enforce quality behaviour on the fly. Our paradigm for modelling behaviour enables efficient execution, validation, simulation, and runtimeverification. The models are executable and efficient because they are compiled (not interpreted). Moreover, they can be developed using test-driven development, where tests are models derived from requirements. We illustrate the approach with case studies from robotics and embedded systems.
INTRODUCTION
Software quality is critical to ensuring systems will not cause harm or economic loss (Bryce and Kuhn, 2014) . The Internet-of-Things (IoT) will demand more reliable software systems (Kopetz, 2011) . Gartner estimates there are 736 million smart devices in the IoT now across manufacturing, utilities, and transportation. However, insufficient software quality can cause the severe malfunction in smart embedded systems (Weiss et al., 2015; Sametinger et al., 2015; Srivastava and Schumann, 2013) .
The opportunities for improvements in software quality are enormous: "risks are becoming salient as our society comes to rely on autonomous or semiautonomous computer systems to make high-stakes decisions" (Dietterich and Horvitz, 2015) . The first and immediate category to deal with are AI software systems (Dietterich and Horvitz, 2015) : automated vehicles, home robots, and intelligent cloud services must perform correctly, even in the presence of a surprising or confusing input. Recommendations emerge for researchers to focus on "self-monitoring architectures in which a meta-level process continually observes the actions of the system, checks that its behaviour is consistent with the core intentions of the designer, and intervenes or alerts if problems are identified" (Dietterich and Horvitz, 2015) .
Experts suggest that the software models for the behaviour of the IoT and smart things are likely to be based on state machines (Bryce and Kuhn, 2014) , as these make software development faster by specifying the behaviour at a higher level of abstraction than traditional programming languages. Use-case traces naturally map to paths through states and transitions. Behavior Engineering (Dromey and Powell, 2005) , a form of requirements engineering, creates these traces and then integrates them into Behavior Trees, from which finite-state machines, describing the behaviour of components, can readily be synthesised.
We will show how to use logic-labelled finite-state machines (LLFSMs) to model mechanisms that can monitor the software system built from the modeldriven development (MDSD) paradigm that LLFSMs offer. The precise semantics of LLFSMs makes them overcome some of the criticisms that MDSD has received (Picek and Strahonja, 2007) while enhancing its advantages. LLFSMs have been proven very effective (Estivill-Castro et al., 2012) for describing software behaviour and for performing model-checking and formal verification, both in the value and the time domain. LLFSMs offer a model of controlled concurrency that scales much better than comparable event-driven modelling approaches (such as UMLstate charts, Behavior Trees, and teleo-reactive systems). Consequently, changing, improving, and maintaining behaviours of embedded systems and robots using LLFSMs is more cost-effective. This high level of modelling means that the behaviour is closer to the original set of human-language requirements and therefore easier to understand. In the systems engineering and robotics communities, state-machines are ubiquitous. MDSD leads to more uniform quality; the LLFSM compiler produces efficient executables as it compiles a general, uniform code that has been structured to minimise overhead. Because of the use of visual models of LLFSMs, the resulting behaviours are more transparent, and the gap between business analysts, requirement engineers, and the developers is reduced. Moreover, to scale to larger systems, LLFSMs have the capacity to incorporate Test-Driven-Development (TDD) methods and derive test suites from use-cases, incorporating such tests as LLFSMs themselves (Estivill-Castro et al., 2015b) . Such TDD can be managed by Continuous Integration Servers (Estivill-Castro et al., 2015a) .
Runtime verification focusses on the design of formal languages for the specification of properties that must hold during runtime (Drusinsky, 2005) . In this paper, we take matters one step further and will create software systems that can monitor the quality of other software systems as they execute, set-up, tear-down, and enforce quality behaviour on the fly. We demonstrate the progress with two concrete case studies: a network of traffic lights and a robotic vehicle.
We use the fact that LLFSMs are executable models analogous to state charts, but with transitions labelled by logic. LLFSMs represent deterministic, executable models that enable formal specifications of requirements, including observable behaviour. We generate agents that can observe and monitor behaviour. This step enables deploying agent technology capable of identifying undesired behaviour, consequentially raising warnings or acting to prevent software malfunction. We use TDD and MDSD tools for the automatic construction of runtime monitoring agents that execute tests, monitor behaviour, and revise software models as they execute. Our monitoring LLFSMs raise the level by which the software is aware of its operational state, since the monitoring agents would be able to report on the behaviour of their underlying software components.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the three architectural elements than enable our approach. The first is the sequential scheduling of arrangements of LLFSMs and that by labelling transitions with Boolean expressions, and not event, they are note event-driven. The second is the capability to communicate between LLFSMs with a data centric in-memory middleware. The third element is the use of control/status messages different from a publish/subscriber pattern and following a writers/readers pattern. Section 3 discusses these architectural elements with a concrete example. This example will be used in Section 4 to describe our approach to runtime verification. While the first example (EstivillCastro and Hexel, 2014 ) is a simple embedded system, Section 5 reviews what has been achieved with robotic systems. Section 6 discusses how to automate the process of generating monitoring LLFSMs while Section 7 discusses the implications regarding safety and security by contrasting with ROSRV (Huang et al., 2014) . Section 8 discusses the proposed work here with the literature and Section 9 summarizes and concludes the paper.
ARCHITECTURAL ELEMENTS
We base our architecture on executable models of behaviour represented by finite-state machines. Importantly, there are three crucial elements in this architecture.
First, transitions are labelled by Boolean expressions only (and not events), hence the name logic-labelled finite-state machine (LLFSM). LLFSMs are Communicating Extended Finite State Machines (CEFSMs) without events (Li and Wong, 2002) . Importantly, the semantics is therefore not that of a software component waiting for an event triggering the switch to a new state. Instead, the components form a single thread of LLFSMs under a predefined schedule. The machine that executes (has the token) evaluates the sequence of transitions associated with its current state. This evaluation could potentially be quite sophisticated and complex (involving planning and/or reasoning), making LLFSMs, not plain reactive architectures, but to also blend into deliberative systems Estivill-Castro and Ferrer-Mesters, 2013) . Control remains with one and only one component, resembling a deterministic polling system (unlike an interrupt handler). If an expression labelling a transition evaluates to true, the transition fires, making its target state the current state of the LLFSM. As with ubiquitous models of state machines, states have ONENTRY, and ONEXIT, and INTERNAL sections. Actions (code) in the ONENTRY section is executed only after a state change. The ONEXIT section is executed after a transition fires, while the INTERNAL section is executed only if all transitions evaluate to false. After either, it becomes the next machine's turn in the arrangement. LLFSMs have a series of mechanisms to handle composition, and to be suspended, resumed or restarted. In addition to interpreters for Simple C 1 and Java, we have efficient LLFSM compilers for C/C++ and Swift under POSIX systems such as Linux or macOS, for microcontrollers, and ROS. LLFSMs are akin to UML state charts where transitions are labelled only by guards.
The second crucial element is the communication middleware between LLFSMs. A state in an LLFSM, and even each section (ONENTRY, ONEXIT, and INTERNAL), can have its own local variables, not shared with any other scope; or they may have the scope of the whole LLFSM. However, beyond one LLFSM, variables reside in an object-oriented whiteboard, implemented in shared memory (EstivillCastro et al., 2014) . The whiteboard can be seen as a data-oriented broker, decoupling readers and writers of information. However, as opposed to most robotic middlewares, where the paradigm of the consumer of information is a Push approach, we use a Pull approach . With the LLFSM execution semantics, our gusimplewhiteboard implementation offers fast, lock-free, atomic reader/writer semantics for multiple readers and even multiple writers. This OO implementation has proven superior in speed and reliability to other middlewares such as ROS' system (Joukoff et al., 2015; .
The third aspect that provides a simpler and clearer semantics, while retaining modelling power and Turing-complete expressivity, is data-centric communication, between components utilising control and status messages. Thus, the whiteboard implements a blackboard control architecture (HayesRoth, 1988) . Control/status messages are an alternative to the scenarios akin to the rendezvous model (Hoare, 1978; Pnueli et al., 1982) in the message passing world, or a synchronous remote procedure call (RPC). By contrast, control/status messages follow the readers/writers paradigm as opposed to producer/consumer or publisher/subscriber. Typically a single class definition is assigned two message slots, Control for control data, and Status for responses (e.g., from a sensor). Both the actuator and the controller components use the Pull paradigm to query their corresponding message slots. This decoupling enables AI planning and reasoning agents who can consume many CPU cycles to be incorporated without interfering with the control architecture provided by LLFSMs .
ILLUSTRATION OF ARCHITECTURAL ELEMENTS
Consider now the LLFSMs in Figure 1 . These machines are part of our later example for run-time verification and are the two behaviours of traffic lights for a crossing of roads going East-West and NorthSouth. The first thing to notice is that analogous to OMT (Rumbaugh et al., 1991) (1) are analogous to the predicates that were used in augmented finitestate machines (AFSM) of the subsumption architecture. In fact, the LISP language for the subsumption architecture (Brooks, 1990 ) is a subset of LLFSMs. Similarly, teleo-reactive programs (Nilsson, 2001) The statement in the INTERNAL section is also the last statement of the ONENTRY section and illustrates the use of a status message. The Boolean variable shallGoGreenNS is updated by retrieving a status message. The writer of this message is a compiled Prolog program that evaluates whether the conditions to move the North-South traffic light to green have been meet . Thus, if the current state of this machine is RED ON NS, this machine will evaluate the variable shallGoGreenNS and not carry out the transition while this variable has the value false. But before relinquishing the token of execution, it performs ints internal section where it updates this transition labeling variable with the ad- vice from the Prolog program. This shows that the models execute the reactive actions of moving to another state in their own time, in an analogous fashion to a time-triggered approach (and definitely distinctive from the event-driven approach of UML state charts).
In our middleware, the data structures used to communicate between LLFSMs (and other modules like running Prolog programs in their own threads) are essentially any C++ object with a standard C/C++ footprint in memory. This communication middleware is illustrated also in this fragment of code. The statement Here, the corresponding slot for this LLFSM is updated in the data structure that the switch will use to relay commands for the traffic lights. The next statement posts this updated data structure back to the whiteboard wb handler.set(aConfiguration); without any need for concurrency synchronisation as the current LLFSMs in the arrangement knows no other LLFSMs is accessing this object.
In summary, LLFSMs are models compiled into loadable modules, not interpreted. They have been compared to artefacts and modelling languages such as Behavior Trees (Dromey and Powell, 2005) , Event-B (Abrial, 2010) , Teleo-reactive programs (Nilsson, 2001) , Executable UML (Mellor and Balcer, 2002) , or SysML (UML tailored for systems engineering).
For formal verification and requirements engineering, they compare favourably with Petri Nets (Billington et al., 2011) and Timed Automata (Estivill-Castro et al., 2015b; Estivill-Castro et al., 2015a) . Software construction with LLFSMs can emulate architectures based on embedded and reactive control as well as behaviour-based control, while adding feasible, formal verification . In this paper, we take these elements further by enabling an architecture for runtime verification.
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
We present the principles of this new software architecture with a classical example (Maier and Warren, 1988 ) of a system that controls traffic lights on an intersection between roads going North-South (NS) and East-West (EW). Requirements evolve from an initial version, with no sensors to a more advanced version with sensors in the EW-direction that, in the absence of a car, enable NS-priority (keeping the traffic lights green in the NS-direction). The declarative requirements demonstrate the integration of reasoning and logic-programming into a reactive system (EstivillCastro et al., 2016) . The most crucial requirement, of course, is that the lights are never simultaneously green in both directions.
The complete system model consists of three LLFSMs in a single arrangement: 2 the Timer LLFSM and two controller LLFSMs. Each controller LLFSM is in charge of a traffic direction and thus, minimally, each is in charge of a set of three lights (a read, a green and an amber light). Two versions of a declarative Prolog program (https://youtu.be/HFm6fbZ6lkg) specify when to switch lights. The Timer machine can be signalled to reset the time value, it regularly posts the time elapsed, and whether that time is greater than 5 seconds, or greater than 30 seconds. 3 The LLFSM for the EW-set of lights controls the green, amber and red light in the EW-direction, cycling through three states such that only one light is on in each state. 4 Thus, in the state On RED EW, in the EW-direction, only the red light is on. Symmetrically, the second controller LLFSM handles the NS-direction, signalling red, amber, and green in that direction, also cycling from green via amber to red, and back to green. All three LLFSMs are scheduled deterministically, and the decisions as to whether to switch state are inspections of Boolean variables on the whiteboard. For example, shallGoRedNS is evaluated by obtaining the value from the whiteboard with the statement shallGoRedNS=stopNS status t; that is, the LLFSM acts as a reader in the Pull architecture of this status message, while the value is updated by a writer that periodically executes the Prolog program. The Prolog program is inside a wrapper LLFSM running in another thread. Such wrapper is synthesised from the Prolog program. Details of the Pull vs Push approach and the control/status approach to constraining concurrency to the readers/writers model (vs. publisher/subscribers) appear elsewhere (Estivill-Castro and Hexel, 2013; . Our focus here is that the system is complete and functional and constitutes an executable model.
Using the sensor and prioritising the NS-direction 3 Diagram for the Timer is 40s into the video (https:// youtu.be/HFm6fbZ6lkg). 4 The EW-controller diagram is displayed and explained from 1m 18s.
is the result of a simple, localised change, restricted to only the Prolog program. Changing between software versions requires swapping between Prolog programs. The LLFSMs can be subject to formal verification (using standard model-checking tools), as the corresponding Kripke structure can be derived directly from the model (and the number of Kripke states is small). In addition, since sometimes expressing properties about system behaviour to perform formal verification can be difficult, it is possible to create a suite of TDD tests by creating test-LLFSMs that set-up, watch, and tear-down the operation of the system (Estivill-Castro et al., 2015a; Estivill-Castro et al., 2015b) . Such testing can validate the system before investing effort into formal verification, and also can raise the confidence of system correctness where state explosion makes formal verification impossible.
We focus on the situation where replacing one behaviour component or any of the four wrappers, at runtime, could result in a faulty system. That is, one should be able to swap between versions without faults manifesting themselves. Of course, one way is to formulate these details as a requirement and build the software accordingly. However, if the decisionmaking process is learnt while running (the Prolog program is composed by something akin to inductive logic programming), then no possible test could have been created originally, as the logic program would not have existed at the time. Once the logic program is available, formal verification may be infeasible (due to the complexity of the system), while testing does not prove the system is correct: it merely shows that no failures occur in a finite subset of cases. More-over, if big data technologies and stream-data analytics were to build, online, sophisticated new rules and software to decide on the settings of the traffic lights, exhaustive testing would be infeasible. Thus, monitoring the system while in execution may actually be required, to correct the effects of traces that lead to failure, but were not discovered earlier.
We propose a revolution of the subsumption architecture (Brooks, 1986) to manage the runtime verification of a system composed of LLFSMs. Our proposal, following the subsumption architecture principles, constructs behaviour from conceptual layers of timed, finite-state machines. What we suggest here is a revolution, because we no longer assume lower layers are correct. The timed aspect means that we have Boolean primitives, after(t), that only become true after t units of time. We, however, go beyond a mechanism to just suppress an input, and even beyond the capacity to inhibit the output from an LLFSM. Instead, we extend the mechanism to suspend (EstivillCastro et al., 2014) an LLFSM and add a mechanism that dynamically loads an LLFSM to join and execute in the arrangement. Correspondingly, we provide mechanisms to also dynamically unload a faulty LLFSM and remove it from the schedule of execution.
The subsumption architecture builds levels of progressively more sophistication, always assuming that the lower layers were entirely correct. In stark contrast, we propose that the lower layers may, in fact, be faulty. In our proposal, higher levels act as behaviour monitors for lower layers. Realisation by a higher layer that a lower layer is malfunctioning, perhaps violating some requirement, is sufficient for the higher layer to take action, including one or several of the following actions.
1. Inhibit the output of the lower layers and replacing it with newer, safer output.
2. Provide input to lower-level machines to steer them, suspend them and/or restart them.
3. Reconfigure the arrangement by unloading some of its LLFSMs and loading non-faulty replacements.
That is, higher layers can rebuild lower layers that exhibit unstable behaviour. Figure 2 shows a component diagram (with the inputs and outputs for the traffic lights and sensor) in the layered style of the subsumption architecture (Brooks, 1986) . Our approach is to take such a system (that receives input from sensors drawn on the left and delivers outputs to actuators) to an expanded and safer level, where a monitor (with a subsumption switch) ensures fundamental safety properties during runtime. This is illustrated by the transformation in Figure 3 , where 3(a) follows (Brooks, 1986 , Page 17, Fig. 3 ) to Figure 3(b) . Note that the original system can be abstracted and treated as a black box from the perspective of the two new components. The first component is a monitor LLFSM, while the second one is a subsumption switch (Côté et al., 2006 ) that can also be modelled/implemented as a (separate) logic-labelled finite-state machine. The added modules can treat the entire set of output signals of the system as inputs ("external" signals from their perspective). The added components (coloured boxes in Figure 3(b) ) are small and thus their formal verification becomes feasible. More importantly, the switch LLFSM is capable of inhibiting dangerous configuration of output signals to the actuators, replacing them with safer configurations. The monitor LLFSM can perform all the actions suggested earlier that reconfigure the running system. Our extension creates a more uniform layered architecture, whether or not the original system is a subsumption architecture. The LLFSM for the switch 5 simply buffers configurations of effector and actuator commands with a given priority.
If the system is a subsumption architecture, the switches already are part of the system and do not need to be replicated. The only requirement is that configurations provided by the monitors have a higher priority level. Moreover, the monitoring LLFSM can have its own API, as we will discuss later.
The generality of the LLFSM approach facilitates that the monitor be also a monitoring LLFSM, and therefore, the monitor is in itself another executable model 6 . For the traffic light system, the monitoring LLFSM checks that the two green lights are never on simultaneously. The monitor will inhibit this via a signal to the switch, which will trigger blinking amber lights in both directions (with all red and green lights turned off). This behaviour signals malfunction to motorists and to the traffic authorities. When the monitor discovers a fault, it loads a machine that expresses a new behaviour (both lights blinking amber), and unloads the current faulty machine, loading default ones. This construction is the generic machinemonitoring pattern.
ROBOTICS CASE STUDY
Our second case study is inspired by the presentation of the runtime verification framework ROSRV (Huang et al., 2014) . This framework aims at raising the level of safety in robotic systems under ROS and mainly consists of a node named RVMaster. It oversees all the peer-to-peer traffic in a ROS environment, blocking messages, and shielding the actual Master node (usually named roscore). The ROSRV architecture places a Monitor between every pair of publishers/subscribers, requiring a large number of monitors. The link between the RVMaster and the ROS Master is secured with a firewall.
This framework is illustrated using a simulator of the LandShark unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) robot. The examples represent situations where two modules responsible for two different tasks (although optimised for their individual responsibilities), when operating simultaneously, produce an overall deficient behaviour. One such example is a gun on the turret having a tracker for a target but when placed on the LandShark UGV body it may hit itself (Huang et al., 2014) . These scenarios are common in other robotic software, and another example discussed with the UGV simulator is combinations of turret positions and accelerations causing it to tip over (Huang et al., 2014) . Although there is no public access to the LandShark simulator, we can reproduce two of the monitoring examples using the ROS Gazebo simulation of a Komodo, a robot that is also an UGV on wheels with an articulated arm and gripper. The forbidden runtime conditions we monitor are actuator commands rather than conditions about forbidden states.
The first scenario is that certain wheel accelerations are not to be set while the arm is extended, as this causes the robot to tip. Second, certain navigation commands are not to be performed as they would take the robot into unsafe terrain. For this last example we have a video (https://youtu.be/MVlghB0JZ1g) that shows one behaviour for exploring a region that is faulty, becoming more prone to accelerate and run into barriers. However, with our runtime verification monitor, when the robot is close to the obstacles, two new behaviours are loaded, one to spin it back and one to guide it to its origin before the earlier behaviour is allowed to operate again. The methodology presented before applies here in a very similar way. We add a subsumption switch to the original system that wraps the motor commands. We add monitoring LLFSMs for the conditions. One simply uses location information directly to track the position of the robot and thus instructing the switch to inhibit motion commands to motors that would place the robot too close to the obstacles. For the other example, the monitor LLFSM reads the arm position sensors, to calculate and track the centre of gravity relative to the base of the robot, adjusting a threshold value in the subsumption switch for the maximum allowed wheel acceleration.
AUTOMATIC GENERATION
In principle, any runtime verification formalism (Alur and Henzinger, 1992; Thati and Roşu, 2005) could be embedded in a monitoring LLFSM because LLFSMs are Turing complete. However, we have chosen a simple mechanism that seems to fit most cases and, moreover, enables the construction of the monitoring LLFSMs from the visualisation of the system LLFSMs. The idea is to evolve LLFSMs constructed for TDD (Estivill-Castro et al., 2015a; Estivill-Castro et al., 2015b) into monitors.
We explain our aproach using the earlier example. The monitored conditions are rather simple. The LLFSM for TDD verifies that the controller LLFSMs are not in designated states simultaneously (e.g., turning all lights to green). This can also be achieved by monitoring the outputs of writer LLFSMs on the whiteboard. In the traffic light example, this would be the message to actuator lights for both green lights to be on.
Therefore, we suggest here that we can have a rather strong logic to express conditions to monitor the runtime validity of LLFSMs that are in the System box of Figure 3 . Moreover, the monitor LLFSM in Figure 3 would be a model constructed completely from these logic expressions, significantly automating the implementation of such monitoring LLFSMs. First, we can describe the basic constructs of the logic to express forbidden conditions by monitoring LLFSMs. The first building blocks are formulas.
<formula> ! <term> | (<formula> <connective> <formula>) | not(<formula>) <term> ! <state formula> | <wb variable formula> <state formula> ! <machine name> @ <state name> <wb variable formula> ! <value> == <wb variable name> <connective> !^| _ An example of the term that expresses that in the LLFSM arrangement of the traffic lights the two controlling machines cannot both be in their respective states where they set their respective lights to green is the following formula.
light ns subsumption @ GREEN ON NŜ light ns subsumption @ GREEN ON EW
Similar formulas can be constructed for many of the safety requirements of the systems discussed in the literature of formal verification and software safety. For example, in the case of a microwave, a crucial requirement is the motor/radiation is not to be on while the door is open:
The microwave is a widely discussed example in the literature of formal verification and model checking (Asarin et al., 2002) . We point out here that from forbidden-condition formulas, the automatic construction of the LLFSM that monitors whether the formula evaluates to true (realises the forbidden condition) is rather simple. It consists of a simple loop where the information for the formula is retrieved from the whiteboard and then the formula is evaluated. Thus, our LLFSM generator only requires a parameter that indicates the period of the loop (using the after() construction mentioned before) and what LLFSM to activate in case the forbidden formula is realised. The designer of our runtime verification LLFSMs uses a GUI to choose states from LLFSMs to build hstate formulai and also to select whiteboard variables to build these formulas from. When whiteboard variables refer to objects, the GUI provides a drop-down menu to select getters to obtain an expression that evaluates to a basic type.
It should be clear that our logic for forbidden formulas is structurally and semantically equivalent to propositional logic. As we already mentioned, an LLFSM that checks such a formula is built by basically including the forbidden formula in a transition from a state that has read the necessary information. Such monitoring LLFSMs, although synthesised automatically are quite impenetrable to human designers. Most of the conditions or rules we have found in case studies on system safety seem to be of this form. However, we have noted that in some situations the forbidden scenario more closely corresponds to a trace of a behaviour. That is, the undesirable behaviour is not that, at a certain point in time, a certain configuration of variable values or states of subLLFSMs is reached in a system. More elaborate, forbidden situations are sequences of formulas. For example, with the traffic lights, control in each direction cycles between green, amber, and red (then back to green). In this case, the forbidden behaviour can be specified by the complement of the regular expression (green amber red) ? . Moreover, the equivalence of regular expressions and non-deterministic automata (and thus, deterministic automata) shows that we can construct monitoring LLFSMs automatically that verify that the system does not have a trace of basic formulas (about states and whiteboard variables) that belongs to a regular language where the alphabet are basic formulas. These monitoring LLFSMs are not expected to be drawn or presented for inspection by human designers, they can be rather large (even if we apply classical algorithms for DFA minimisation in the building of the corresponding monitoring LLFSM). However, the corresponding regular expressions are quite manageable by system designers. Today, for example, many programming languages or (web) search facilities, offer tools to construct and visualise regular expressions. Thus for now, we consider this aspect less of a priority except that the architecture proposed here integrates the resulting monitoring LLFSMs quite naturally for expressing a language of forbidden traces in the running system under verification. Our clfsm tool enables the introspection of the running system to obtain the trace of the system's state changes. This is another aspect in which the deterministic scheduling of arrangements of LLFSMs is an advantage, as the traces are not subject to pre-emptive scheduling if, for example, each LLFSM were to run as a separate thread.
The spot package allows the derivation of monitors (option -M for ltl2tgba); and we could use the spot libraries to automatically synthesise the monitor for our architecture directly as an LLFSM. In several robotic systems with planning and manipulation tasks, the LTL subset named co-safe LTL has been used (He et al., 2015) because it produces deterministic finite-automata (Kupferman and Vardi, 2001) . Here again, Büchi automata can be directly modelled by LLFSMs. Our architecture can confirm co-safe LTL formulae, but if the formula has the modal operator for "eventually", the monitoring LLFSM can not guarantee when such a condition is met (in the case of task planning it enables one to recognise a plan has found a goal meeting the co-safe LTL condition). However, we are studying a possible form of these logics or their variations for future bounded temporal logics. Note that timed regular expressions are equivalent to timed automata (Asarin et al., 2002) . However, timed automata are non-deterministic in the sense that their execution/simulation on a computer is only one of the many execution paths. Thus, at the moment, these other formalisms to specify undesirable behaviours seem to demand a monitoring instrument that would be resource intensive.
SAFETY AND SECURITY ISSUES
Our architecture provides compile-time type safety because commands between LLFSMs and from the subsumption switch to effectors and actuators are OO-messages on the gusimplewhiteboard. The only LLFSM that has access to these message types is the subsumption switch. All other LLFSMs only have access to the abstraction and interface the subsumption switch offers. Other LLFSMs cannot access effectors and actuators directly. The subsumption switch only forwards specific commands (to effectors and actuators) if such commands are placed in corresponding slots of the hierarchy by the respective LLFSMs of the system or the monitor. Our compile-time type safety is significantly more secure than RVMaster (Huang et al., 2014) because, for RVMaster, the underlying middleware is in itself ROS, lacking any security mechanisms (Huang et al., 2014) : ROS allows any node to read all the available topics and services at runtime. In our proposal, we restrict which LLFSMs in an arrangement can perform operations such as load, unload, suspend, and resume. But monitoring LLFSMs have clearance for such operations on system LLFSMs. We are assuming that the software would need to exist in an environment isolated from penetration of malicious users who could plant such malicious LLFSMs in the paths read by the clfsm instance executing the arrangement. The runtime verification here aims at safety by protecting from Byzantine faults of wellintentioned components that have evolved though potentially independent constraints and objectives, and whose synergies could cause malfunction in the system.
Evolving software modules (for learning a walk on a quadruped robot, or for tracking with a neck or turret with additional degrees of freedom), optimise their main task and thus they have a restricted range of messages for certain restricted families of effectors/actuators. We assume that system security is such that validated LLFSMs cannot be replaced with malicious ones. Moreover, the monitoring LLFSM is able to reset self-modifying modules by unloading the learnt/evolved, detrimental behaviour causing poor synergies with other modules and load a validated behaviour. In our traffic lights example, the video illustrates rebuilding at execution time the default behaviour and unloading the initial faulty behaviour. Another example is a robot learning to control its arm as it discovers the environment (see our video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 3VylSPQoEE).
The whiteboard middleware discussed earlier provides a channel to monitoring LLFSMs (monitors). Thus, monitors could receive the suspend command. This enables testing systems without the monitoring (which could be resumed later) or running the system under different configurations of the properties that are being monitored. This facility to also configure monitoring systems during runtime has been used before (Huang et al., 2014) , and in our proposal here is immediately available through the existing mechanisms of the whiteboard. Thus, it is possible to extend the subsumption architecture and the hierarchy of clearance classes by more than one level. Monitoring LLFSMs are also controllable. The suggested earlier transformation (from Figure 3 (a) to Figure 3(b) ) of adding a subsumption switch and a monitor (both LLFSMs) can be re-iterated several times as designers see fit, with higher levels being able to suspend, decommission, reload, and/ or reconfigure the components of the lower layers underneath.
CONTRAST WITH RELATED WORK
Runtime Verification (Kim et al., 1999; Havelund, 2000) focusses on how to monitor, analyse, and guide the execution of software, using lightweight formal methods applied during the execution of programs. Although formal validation of properties against running systems has been a long-standing concern in software engineering (for example instance dynamic typing), our suggestion here follows the current practices in testing (particularly modelbased testing) when used before and during deployment of fault-tolerant systems. Note that the current practice for detecting and possibly reacting to observed behaviours satisfying or violating certain properties is to represent such properties with tracepredicate formalisms, such as finite state machines, regular expressions, context-free patterns, and lin-ear temporal logics. LLFSMs are extremely suitable to describe verification properties and encompass all of the earlier mechanisms, as they are Turing complete (Estivill-Castro and Hexel, 2013) . Note that a large number of tools and approaches have been produced for the runtime monitoring of sequential or concurrent programs in traditional coding languages such as C++, C, and Java (Delgado et al., 2004) ; however, essentially no work has appeared for carrying out runtime verification using model-driven development tools. The reliability of time-triggered systems is significantly easier to determine than that of event-triggered systems (Kopetz, 1993; Lamport, 1984) . Time-triggered systems handle peak-load situations by design, enable software components to communicate using constant bandwidth and regular overhead even at peak load situations. By contrast, eventdriven systems are inherently unpredictable, they can collapse during peak loads or event showers, and no analytical guarantees can be given for their performance (Kopetz, 1993; Lamport, 1984) . Surprisingly runtime-verification tools have been proposed using a modeling approach based on events (Barringer et al., 2012; Colombo et al., 2008) and that their implementation is made in Java with unrealistic claims regarding real-time verification (but an admission of this issue is present (Colombo et al., 2008, Page 141) ).
Such monitor-oriented programming (Chen and Roşu, 2003) , in the environment of robotics systems, (in particular the Robotics Operating System ROS) requires ROSRV as an arbiter (Huang et al., 2014) of the appropriateness of message passing, introducing additional message relays and potential critical delays. Nevertheless, as discussed in the presentation, ROSRV is perhaps the closest approach related to our proposal here; but our architecture compares favourably. In ROSRV, security, scalability, and formal verification were identified as issues for further work (Huang et al., 2014) . With respect to security, ROSRV solely relies on network routing of trusted IP addresses. Moreover, ROSRV is centralised and policies and monitors need to be established for each publisher/subscriber pair, which does not scale well. The LLFSMs that act as the switch and the monitor can be formally verified in our architecture. We have also identified other advantages of our proposal, namely the specification of conditions to monitor are naturally and automatically derived and expressed from the LLFSM models in model-driven development style.
We would argue that the subsumption architecture (Brooks, 1986 ) and teleo-reactive systems are now classical mechanisms to produce reactive systems, that, in their inception, have been logic-labelled (and not event-driven), and in the case of the former, been significantly revolutionising the software architectures of robotic systems towards behaviourbased systems. In the case of the latter, several advances have been made to enable them with formal verification tools (Dongol et al., 2014) or implementation tools (Sánchez et al., 2012) . However, teleoreactive programs do have the danger of undefined behaviour (Hayes, 2008) .
Both, the subsumption architecture and teleoreactive systems, suffer issues with their semantics of concurrency analogous to the issues of nested statediagrams in UML. Issues such as state nesting (Simons, 2000) or other ambiguities (von der Beeck, 1994; Simons, 2000) , have resulted in several problems with executable UML and its use in ModelDriven-Development. Most tools and approaches on formal methods based on UML must restrict themselves: for example, restrictions to the consistency and completeness of the artefact (Pap et al., 2005) or to Practical Formal Specification's (PFS) where events are precluded and component communications happen only through their declared inputs and outputs (Iwu et al., 2007) . The community seems to largely follow Harel and Gery's executable model of hierarchical statecharts (Harel and Gery, 1996) , which has an execution semantics akin to a remote procedure call (RPC) under the Run-to-Completion Execution Model (RTC) (Samek, 2008, Page 2.2.8) : that is, the system keeps queueing events, while handling an earlier event. Such complicated semantics and runtime uncontrolled concurrency results in much higher complexity of runtime verification.
REFLECTION AND CONCLUSION
Clearly, software should be validated and verified before being deployed into production, and the present work here in runtime verification does not intend to minimise the critical role of validation, verification, and testing. However, as we move into software that adapts and evolves while in execution, it becomes much more critical to additionally ensure correctness at runtime. As the capabilities of artificial intelligence, such as machine learning, matures, large systems will increasingly update their parameters, threshold values, or entire components during their life time. One alternative to runtime verification is that the trace of a running system be potentially logged as data sets for machine learning, from which to create a verified and validated system to replace the system in operation. Such an approach may be worthwhile; however, it would miss the ability of incor-porating experiences learnt between validated snapshots. Instead, one would like to have a running system that is always learning and using the best inferences from its continuous operation. Moreover, we have demonstrated that we can even decommission LLFSMs in the arrangement and let the temporary inconsistent behaviour be managed by the supervising behaviour. Such a replacement of one or more LLFSMs in a system could be significantly more organic, depending on particular external factors that have caused the system to evolve in particular ways, which cannot be entirely anticipated and verified. Thus, the need for runtime verification. The software may very well outlive its designers and developers as it continues to operate uninterruptedly. In fact, a key point of software quality is minimal downtime and continuous operation. Such is our expectation already of, for example, the web, where there is a large number of components (servers) that are down, while the system as a whole continues to operate and renew itself without global down-time. Here, we transfer this into the world of robotics and complex, safetycritical real-time systems. Software re-use should imply that elements and components continue to execute despite others being down.
